A Runway Excursion Excursion 2.0
Edited 3/4/2026. Added new perspectives.
Read time 15 minutes.
Summary
Most accidents happen on takeoff and landing. I think the prevailing solutions today unintentionally contribute to the problem, and I offer an alternative for your consideration. This is a practical guide to move the needle on business aviation accidents, grounded in real-world data and human factors.
Additional information and perspectives have entered the arena since the original publication. My thanks to the following resources for added research and clarity (book reports at the end):
Deep Survival: Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why by Laurence Gonzales
Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions by Gary A. Klein
Streetlights and Shadows: Searching for the Keys to Adaptive Decision Making by Gary A Klein
Flight Safety Savannah: Advanced Rejected Takeoff Go, No-Go Course
NBAA Reducing Runway Excursions in Business Aviation.
Source: NTSB
Details
Baseline
First, there are assumptions about the environment in which you are operating. This is for Part 91 business operators, and we have some advantages over our 135 and 121 brothers and sisters. I.E., optional reduced thrust takeoffs, lower V1 speeds, less mass, typically well under gross takeoff weights, shorter wingspans, excess brake energy, excess power, great automation, operational flexibility, and less regulation. Adversely, we can operate into shorter and more complex airstrips with fewer services on less notice.
Additionally, the way I operate is assumed. See SMS article. Things like always checking your fluids and flight controls, being well-rested and not hurried, being well-trained and practiced, and doing your pre-flight performance calculations are assumed. In other words, operating as a professional. Lastly, aircraft specifics and capabilities come into play.
Takeoff
It is important, from the outset, to base your takeoff decisions on what is actually happening in the real world, NOT on what COULD happen. Anything could happen, and as pilots, we like to dream up and discuss any possibility. That is lab work and theory, but in the real world, people die.
What kills people is deciding to abort when you are going too fast in situations where it is safer to continue the takeoff.
Based on accident data, the lowest-hanging fruit for reducing takeoff accidents is to provide a simplified framework that enables pilots to execute timely reactions and favor continued takeoffs.
Proposal:
Any malfunction below 80 knots - ABORT
80 knots to V1 - if an engine rolls back, or there is a loss of direction control - ABORT
V1 or above - CONTINUE if you can
If there is a malfunction, the only calls are ABORT or CONTINUE
Empower experienced pilots to deviate from the above based on their intuition.
Let's unpack that.
Source: Flight Safety Foundation, Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions
Accident stats: 2/3rds of runway excursions on takeoff are overruns (NBAA). 4/5 of RTOs are non-engine-related (NBAA). 1/2 of RTO accidents could have been prevented by continuing the takeoff (Flight Safety). RTO above 100 knots = most overruns (NBAA). RTO above 120 knots = most deaths (Flight Safety).
0-80
Why 80 knots? First, most of your takeoff roll, by time, occurs below 80 knots, even at max gross weights. Secondly, the kinetic energy at 80 knots is about 40% of that at V1 (energy increases exponentially with velocity). Thirdly, real-world aborts below 80 knots are most common (4/5ths) and usually result in safe outcomes. So by aborting below 80 knots due to malfunctions, you've captured most of the takeoff time and are in a lower-energy state with room to stop.
80 knots also builds in a margin. A Qantas study of real-world pilot reactions shows a 2-4 second lag between malfunction and abort inputs. If you recognize a malfunction at 80, you could easily be through 100 before you start to decelerate.
What qualifies as a malfunction? CAS messages, loss of control, smoke, smells, disturbances, etc. Anything that would keep you from adding power at the start of takeoff qualifies.
80-V1
This middle zone is the most difficult. It is a high-pressure, time-compressed, limited information, human factors-loaded, life-or-death situation. A plan of action needs to be clear and simple.
It is a rare profession in which life-or-death decisions are compressed into a short window of reaction and action. One tactic within military forces is when you encounter a person in close quarters who you do not know if they are a threat or not, you buy more time with a muzzle thump.
Instead of entering a room gun blazing, you prioritize your own and your team's safety by incapacitating a potential threat by thumping a suspect in the chest with your weapon. It provides sufficient force for safety while not causing undue harm or loss of life if you're wrong.
This aligns with the Patten adage, "A good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week." This wisdom can be applied to aviation. Based on the data, the safest course of action is to avoid overruns by limiting aborts to a few specific situations.
The industry standard takeoff brief has become a word salad:
"This will be a 20-flap, rated power takeoff from runway 10. Autobrakes will be set to RTO. Required runway is 4,350 feet with 9,351 feet available. This will be a rolling/standing takeoff. Either crew member can call an abort. We'll abort for any abnormality before 80 knots. Between 80 knots and V1 we'll only abort for annunciated warnings, engine failure, loss of directional control or if the aircraft is unsafe to fly. If an engine fails after V1, we'll climb out at V2 of 132 knots to our acceleration altitude of 1600 feet, at which time we'll accelerate to VSE which is 150 knots. Our clearance is runway heading to 3,000 feet. There are no terrain concerns or climb performance restrictions today. Do you have any questions, comments, or did I miss anything?" - Gulfstream OM
This is vastly overcomplicated and negative training because it distracts from what is most critical and encourages troubleshooting issues while barreling down the runway. A takeoff brief should, as simply as possible, focus on the reaction needed to abort or continue within the 80-V1 speed window.
You can only hold 5 or 6 thoughts in short-term memory at a time (Deep Survival), and that does not include how you can respond in an emergency. When in survival situations, 90% of people are unable to think clearly or solve problems under stress (Deep Survival).
Instead, reduce to a minimum and make it specific: loss of directional control and engine rollback.
Loss of directional control is an unexpected, unexplained, and/or uncommanded deviation from the centerline observed by the pilot flying. The pilot flying's attention is focused on the takeoff and a loss of control.
An engine rollback is a specific and observable event. Instead of having to interpret malfunctions in the heat of battle, it communicates exactly what to look for and captures the bad stuff: power loss due to engine fire, engine failure, and thrust reverser deployment. In these situations, the engine will roll back due to a failure, or the FADEC will command a power reduction (confirm with your specific aircraft - if you don't have FADEC or if the FADEC logic is different, don't apply this strategy). This allows the pilot monitoring to make their callouts and have a single criterion to react to in an emergency.
There is insufficient time to remember, recognize, diagnose, troubleshoot, and act while rapidly accelerating down the runway. You are aborting when you have to and buying time by continuing the takeoff in all other situations. It is a muzzle thump, a good enough decision executed immediately to preserve precious seconds.
V1+
Above V1 is always best to takeoff if you can. On a really bad day, there may be nothing you can do, the plane won't fly, and your only option is abort.
New Brief:
"Below 80, we will ABORT for any malfunctions.
80 to V1, we will ABORT for loss of directional control or engine rollback.
Above V1, we will CONTINUE if we can."
But what about...
This is the point where pilots dream up every possible scenario where this won't work. Reminder: what is killing people is going off the end of the runway because pilots initiate RTO when too fast, usually above V1. Likely because pilots are processing and troubleshooting rather than reacting as they accelerate.
Aviation is a tightly coupled system (Deep Survival), and the uncomfortable truth is that accidents are normal and even expected. The above system simplifies communication, provides clear criteria for responding, reduces response time, and addresses real-world accidents. It is setting you up for a higher chance of survival.
Simplicity is highly underrated. Keeping it simple means this works on days when you're not 100% due to fatigue or complacency. That is the baseline muzzle thump that is the safest course of action in most situations. Now, for those unforeseen occurrences, there is a final stopgap.
Intuition
Firefighter Fire Chiefs, in time-critical, ambiguous situations, have shown the ability to instinctively understand and act without taking time to process the problem (Sources of Power). I have personally experienced this in aviation. Highly experienced professionals, performing optimally, can act intuitively without deliberation. There is no need to weigh decisions.
Pilots should retain the authority to deviate from the above based on intuition. How do you know if you are experienced enough? Well, you won't be thinking about it; you'll already have done it. This is really for the aftermath. Leadership should support instinctive actions. No Monday morning quarterbacks questioning their response now that all information and an extended amount of time are available to choose the best course of action.
You reacted in the heat of battle. If you live to tell the tale, there may be lessons learned for the future, but questioning why people didn't blindly follow the rules is dangerous in the highly complex world of aviation.
Allowing deviation from the baseline response based on intuition can capture rare, wildcard situations where the best decision may go against the default answer. For example, all brakes go out before 80 knots on a tight runway, and the experienced pilot recognizes and safely continues the takeoff. Or an engine fire without power loss occurs between 80 knots and V1, and you intuitively know there is enough runway to stop safely.
Implementing
Let's say you're convinced and you want to change your approach to takeoff. It is not as easy as flipping a switch and deciding you're going to do it this way. If you've been through several recurrents, you have a lot of negative training to overcome. Not bad training, but the opposite of this.
Your career so far has focused on aborts for most Red CAS messages. Continuing a takeoff when a Red CAS message lights off, that is not an engine rollback, is a difficult switch to flip in your head. Get batting practice in the sim. This is an unsponsored plug for Flight Safety's Go, No-Go course. Another bonus: in the course, you will practice immediate return-to-land scenarios in case you do take off and need to get back on the ground (sub 2 min).
If you implement this change, your entire flight department should be on board. It would be better for all pilots to maintain the status quo and stay on the same page, rather than a mix-and-match of strategies, and make it more complex.
Lastly, do your homework. If your engines are non-FADEC or have different rollback logic, you will not be able to simplify to this degree.
Landing
Landing excursion data is straightforward: energy mismanagement. Aircraft are not arriving on speed, on power, and on point.
Over and over, "the pilot failed to fly a stabilized approach and failed to execute a go-around." The industry response is to "fly stabilized approaches!" Defined as on speed, configured, aligned, and steady descent by 1000 ft (500 ft VFR) or go-around. Be a perfect pilot every time.
Source: Flight Safety Foundation, Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions
Stick and rudder skills
Instead of blaming the pilot's skill, my question is, how has the system contributed to this energy mismanagement issue?
A stabilized approach is an ideal scenario under ideal conditions. It works excellently for airliners vectored to 10-mile ILS approaches at radar-controlled airports. However, in business aviation, disturbances regularly occur that deviate from the ideal. For example, you're held high for lower crossing traffic heading into an uncontrolled field, tower requests a tighter base than the 5-mile final, traffic is in the pattern, or the terrain or airspace constraints around common destinations (PWK, SDL, TEX, ASE, etc.).
When the environment forces us into a less-than-ideal position, the pilot is now in a unique and UNPRACTICED situation. The pilot may lack recent experience to the point that a normal landing approach becomes difficult in unfamiliar situations. Pushing for 100% compliance with stabilized approaches has had the unintended consequence of atrophying pilot skill.
The alternative solution is not to train to avoid abnormal situations but to practice them intentionally. Use every deadhead opportunity when there is a performance margin to develop energy management skills. Start high, low, or fast; fly a curved approach to a 500 ft final, and practice approaches without backing them up. Practice how long and how much altitude it takes for your aircraft to decelerate on a 3-degree glideslope.
The idea is that instead of restricting what an acceptable approach is, you become more experienced, more trained, and more skilled, so you can expand the criteria for a satisfactory approach and become better equipped to identify when you are in a safe energy management window. Opposed to the avoidance strategy, this is an engagement strategy.
It is not asking a professional pilot to do anything you would not ask of a student pilot: gain experience in the real world so you understand what an acceptable approach is, how to manage energy and return to the ideal glide path, and recognize when you are outside of a safe window and execute a go-around when necessary.
Go-Around
You always have the option to go-around (mechanical defects and bush flying aside). According to the data, being long and fast are the killers. These two factors should be the primary energy management data for making a go-around decision.
Currently, 1% of unstable approaches result in a go-around (NBAA). This is due to the definition of a stable approach and pilots ignoring stabilized approach gates. What isn't captured in the data is that even though an approach may be flagged as unstable at 1000 ft, most of the time, there was enough margin for the pilot to correct before touchdown and make a safe landing.
A stable approach, as currently defined, is an ideal line. In reality, safe landings are more like a funnel. There is an acceptable deviation from the ideal that shrinks as you approach the runway. That is why many approaches are flagged as unstable but still result in a safe landing.
The currently defined stabilized approach and go-around criteria are practically ignored and, therefore, useless. Assuming pilots take the opportunities available to expand their skills described above, I propose an expansion of the acceptable approach criteria and add a go-around gate:
At 200 ft above minimums on an instrument approach
or
200 ft above touchdown on a visual
You are on speed, on power, on point, and aligned.
If not, go-around.
The goal is still to be stabilized early (500 or 1000 ft). I am not advocating aiming to be stabilized at 200 feet or waiting to go around until 200 feet on a truly unstable approach. The difference is defining a red line that pilots agree not to cross. It's a new hard-cap gate: if the approach is unstable, fast, or high, we have already decided to go around rather than attempt to save it.
Setting the go-around gate at 500 or 1000 feet doesn't align with the practicalities of flying. Once you have physically and mentally passed those gates, the next step is landing, so having high gates may make pilots less likely to execute a go-around when unstable. Adding a lower gate serves as a final check before continuing.
Aviate
Discuss with your flight department, Takeoffs and Landings.
Plan to practice. How can you expand your energy management envelope?
Send feedback!
Consider a Flight Safety Go, No-Go course.
Navigate
Reducing Runway Excursions in Business Aviation - NBAA
Reducing the Risks of Runway Excursions - Flight Safety Foundation
Rejecting a Takeoff After V1...Why Does it (Still) Happen? - NLR Air Transport Safety Institute
Book Reports
Deep Survival: Who Lives, Who Dies, and Why by Laurence Gonzales
First Lesson: Remain calm. Don't panic.
10-20% of people stay calm in the midst of a survival situation.
Face reality.
When you walk across the ramp to your airplane, you lose half your IQ.
Be aware that you're not all there.
Go 60%. Don't sweat it when it's cool.
Rational thought always lags behind emotion.
90% of people are unable to think clearly or solve problems under stress.
Survivors are constantly adapting.
Working memory can only hold a few things, six or so.
Large accidents are normal.
Efforts to make systems safer make them more complex, and therefore more prone to accidents.
The safety precautions taken may make the next accident more likely.
Better technology and more experience put you into harder environments.
Peer pressure, schedules, misperceptions, and disregarding insights lead to judgment faults.
We are human; our attention is fragmentary. We get excited, tired, and stupid.
Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions by Gary A. Klein
(Firefighters) are not making decisions, they are intuiting what needs to be done.
Satisficing: pick the first option that works. It's faster.
Recognitional Decision Making (RPD): match patterns based on experience.
Intuition comes from experience.
Mental simulations can have up to 3 variables and 6 transitions.
Experts see what is invisible to everyone else: patterns, anomalies, the big picture, the way things work, opportunities and improvisations, past and future events, small differences, and their own limitations.
Experience can make good decisions in less time. The first option considered is usually a high-quality decision.
Training high-level skills should emphasize perceptual skills and procedures.
Telling stories transfers experience (hangar talk). Focus on tough cases that were non-routine, where skill makes the difference, and where a novice would likely fail.
Flight crews perform non-routine tasks better after long flights because they have had time to work together.
Streetlights and Shadows: Searching for the Keys to Adaptive Decision Making by Gary A Klein
In complex and ambiguous situations, there is no substitute for experience.
In complex situations, people will need judgment skills to follow procedures effectively and to go beyond them when necessary.
Systematic analysis works well for simple tasks with good, complete information.
Herbert Simon coined the term Satisficing: pick the first option that gets the job done, and don't worry about where it is the best.
Decision aids try to solve consistency, but that is not a problem people worry about.
Experience doesn't wait for data; you use experience to actively scan for threats and hazards.
NBAA Reducing Runway Excursions in Business Aviation
From 2017 to 2022, 41% of corporate aviation accidents were runway excursions.
Takeoff = 21% of runway excursions
Most actual RTOs are non-engine-related (about 80% are not engine-related)
76% of RTOs are less than 80 knots
18% of RTOs are 80-100 knots
4% of RTOs are 100-120 knots
2% of RTOs are 120+ knots (most deaths occur here)
RTOs at 100+ knots = most overruns
2/3rds of takeoff excursions are overruns, 1/3 are veering off the runway.
Landing = 79% of excursions
Approach and Landing = 65% of accidents
83% of these accidents could have been prevented with a go-around (54% of all accidents!).
A go-around was executed on 3% of unstable approaches.
Unstable approaches are the #1 common factor of runway excursions.
Unstable approaches + landing long + fast + no go-around = most significant factors.
65% of long/fast touchdowns result from unstable approaches
Vref + 10 = 20% increase in landing distance
A long flare = 30% increase in landing distance
Dipping below the glide slope to land closer to the end of the runway does not result in shorter landing distances due to the shallower approach angle and longer resulting float.